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ABSTRACT
This paper incorporates foreign direct investment and product di¤erentiation in a general equilibrium
trade model. The analysis shows that freer trade and FDI will upgrade China’s technology, improve
its skills of labor, and increase the competitiveness of local …rms in the international market. At the
same time, FDI in di¤erentiate sectors will increase the relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor.
The size of this rise will be a¤ected by the degree of protection for intellectual property rights. These
theoretical results are consistent with empirical evidence. The analysis provides insights in coordinating
policies on foreign direct investment, labor market reform, and intellectual property rights protection.
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1 Introduction
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a strategic economic policy adopted by China
to upgrade technology and boost economic growth. FDI in‡ows into China have increased rapidly in
the past three decades, especially into the 1990s. Since 1993, China has become the second largest FDI
recipient after the United States (United Nations, 1999). Firms with FDI have contributed to over 40%
of China’s total trade since the mid-1990s.
With China’s imminent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), FDI will penetrate more
of the Chinese economy. Notwithstanding the bene…ts FDI can bring, what potential risks can such
in‡uxes of FDI impose on the domestic economy? What policies can help a host country reduce such
risks and maximize the bene…ts, especially with large FDI in‡ows as in China’s case? Moran (1998)
synthesizes evidence drawn from a wealth of case studies to assess policies toward FDI in developing
countries and economies in transition. He …nds that there is indeed a large and vital role for host
country authorities to play in designing policies to manage FDI in‡ows, and that the needed actions
di¤er substantially from conventional wisdom.
This paper will focus on the e¤ect of FDI on China’s relative wage of skilled and unskilled labor,
and explore the policy implications for China’s labor market reform. This is particularly important as
access to the Chinese market by foreign trade and investment under the WTO rules can bring dramatic
changes to China’s employment and division of labor. The signi…cance of the impact of FDI on China’s
relative wages may be concealed by the relatively small share of foreign funded enterprises (FFEs) in
China’s total employment. But wages like all the other prices are set at the margin. FFEs can push
up the wages even if their employment share is small.1 Indeed, multinational …rms are found to have
contributed to increasing inequality in income distribution in China. Zhang and Zheng (1998) show that
the GINI coe¢cient of the per capita wages in industrial sectors almost doubled between 1985 and 1995.
One of the culprits identi…ed for this increase in income inequality is the entering of multinationals.
Table 1 shows that the employment shares of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-
1Leamer (1994, 1998 and 2000) and Wood (1994 and 1995) demonstrate that wages are linked to prices rather than to
volumes. Their empirical results show that trade can be the main cause of growing wage inequality between skilled and
unskilled labor regardless of trade’s insigni…cant contribution to total GDP.
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owned enterprises (COEs) in urban areas have declined while that of the FFEs has increased since 1985.
From 1985 to 1998, the average wage of the SOEs was on average 5% higher than the total average
wage, that of the COEs was on average 23% lower, while that of the FFEs was on average 46% higher
as shown in Table 2. These data demonstrate that FFEs have been successfully expanding their market
shares by using higher wages to attract labor from other domestic …rms.
The relationship between the amount of FDI and the average wage in each sector is, however, not
monotonic as illustrated in Figure 1. This suggests that not all FDIs have the same e¤ect on wages.
To understand the variation, we can trace to the sources and patterns of China’s FDI. Figure 2 shows
that most FDI in the manufacturing sector from developing countries are relatively labor intensive
while that from developed countries are relatively capital or technology intensive. Overall, developed
countries invest mostly in technology or human capital intensive (high-tech) sectors, such as electronic
and machinery, while developing countries invest mostly in labor intensive (low-tech) sectors, such as
food and textiles (Chen, 1997a and 1997b; Zhang and Zheng, 1998).
Given these di¤erences, a question is whether FDI in di¤erent sectors has di¤erent impacts on the
relative wage of skilled and unskilled labor. Since most FDIs in China are export oriented as FDI
provides a channel for foreign …rms to exploit China’s cheaper labor input, the traditional Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model predicts that, as FDI induces more trade, the relative wage of unskilled labor to
skilled labor in China (with a relatively abundant unskilled labor endowment) will increase. However,
Figure 3 shows that the annual growth rate of real wages in those unskilled labor intensive sectors are
actually slower than the other skilled labor intensive sectors with di¤erentiated goods.
There has not been a completely satisfactory explanation of how FDI a¤ects relative wages of skilled
to unskilled labor. Feenstra and Hanson (1997 and 1999), Leamer (1998 and 2000), Krugman (2000),
and Xu (2000) suggest that whether a factor or sector biased technical progress induced by FDI can
change factor prices is ambiguous, depending on a country’s size and whether the technical progress is
global or national. Sector bias matters as long as the technical progress is non-identical across countries
and factor bias is all that matters for a large economy if the technical progress is global and identical
and the preferences are Cobb-Douglas.
As can be seen from Figure 2, many FDIs in China are in the di¤erentiated sectors where quality as
well as quantity matters. Thus, this paper extends the above analysis on the impact of technology on
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relative wages for homogeneous goods to study how FDI induced technical progress can a¤ect China’s
relative wages when there are product di¤erentiation and when di¤erent quality varieties require di¤erent
skill intensity of production. The paper will then discuss the role of intellectual property rights on FDI’s
impact on relative wages, which has not received much attention in the literature. Other related works
will be discussed in the next section.
In sum, this paper develops a general equilibrium trade model with both horizontal and vertical
product di¤erentiation to demonstrate that FDI in di¤erentiated sectors tends to increase the relative
wage of skilled to unskilled labor rather than decrease it. This relative wage increase will be smaller
if China enforces stricter protection of intellectual property rights. The theoretical …ndings from the
model are used together with empirical evidence to analyze China’s likely future relative wage changes,
taking into consideration the di¤erence in FDI sources. Policy implications are drawn for the integration
of policies on FDI, intellectual property rights, and labor market reform.
2 The Theoretical Model
Markusen and Venables (1996 and 1997) …rst relate multinational investment to wage inequality by
developing a …rm-based general equilibrium trade model. Recent studies have developed international
trade models of income distribution that depart from the assumption of exogenous technical change,
and link economic openness to changes in factor prices through the acceleration of endogenous technical
change. Examples include Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), Dinopoulos, Syropoulos and Xu (1999),
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b and 1999) and Richardson (1995). This paper identi…es and inves-
tigates a new trade-related mechanism of income distribution: one that relates a multinational …rm’s
endogenous choice of product quality to factor prices.2
On the production side, this paper integrates the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of multination-
als and production di¤erentiation in Helpman and Krugman (1985) with the Ricardian model of product
2 In the literature of growth, technology, and income distribution, Grossman and Helpman (1991) provide a pioneering
analysis of North-South trade, technology development and the welfare e¤ect of imitation due to lack of intellectual property
rights protection. They focus on the dynamic process of innovation and imitation of local …rms. This paper focuses on the
process of technology di¤usion through foreign direct investment in sectors with di¤erentiated goods and technologies.
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and technology di¤erentiation in Flam and Helpman (1987).3 This allows us to analyze a multinational
…rm’s endogenous choice of quality and its consequent e¤ect on relative wages of skilled and unskilled
labor. On the consumption side, the paper takes the approach in Shaked and Sutton (1987) on product
di¤erentiation, where a product is both vertically (quality) and horizontally (characteristics) di¤erenti-
ated. A consumer chooses a variety with certain quality and price …rst and then chooses a brand closest
to his/her most preferred characteristics.4
The structure of the model is as follows. There are two countries, China and the rest of the world,
and two goods, X and Y . Good X is di¤erentiated in both quality and characteristics as in Shaked and
Sutton (1987). This models consumers’ choices among goods of di¤erent qualities as well as goods with
the same quality but di¤erent attributes. Since good X is di¤erentiated, it is sold under monopolistic
competition. The quality of the di¤erentiated good is denoted by q and q > 0. There is no consumption
when q = 0. Good Y is homogeneous and is sold in a perfectly competitive market.
There are two factors of production, labor and capital. In this paper, capital is broadly construed
to include both physical capital and human capital (skilled labor) while labor restrictively refers to
unskilled labor. The output of the homogeneous good, Y , is given by the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Y = L1=2y K
1=2
y (1)
where Ly is the labor input and Ky is the capital/skilled labor input in the Y -sector.




where Lx is the labor input and Kx is the capital/skilled labor input in the X-sector. A higher h
represents a Hicks-neutral technical improvement of labor and capital while a lower ¸ represents a skill-
biased technical improvement. Both h and ¸ represent a sector biased technology improvement in the
3A compendium of the trade models under monopolistic competition can be found in Grossman (1992). Copeland and
Kotwal (1996) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997) also apply the Ricardian model with product di¤erentiation to analyze the
pattern of trade between developed and developing countries.
4This approach assembles the properties in the case of “pure vertical” attributes as in Shaked and Sutton (1982 and
1983) and in the case of “pure horizontal” attributes as in Dixit and Norman (1980) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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X-sector. This speci…cation assumes that the capital-labor ratio increases with quality, q. There is also
a …xed cost, F , associated with the production of good X.5
A consumer buys only one unit of the di¤erentiated good and his utility increases with quality. A
higher quality can be interpreted as a product with more and/or better features. Hence, two units of
a product with identical features may not increase a consumer’s utility. This explains a consumer’s
behavior of replacing his/her slower PC with a faster PC rather than buying another slower PC. Here,
quality rather than quantity matters and di¤erent qualities may not even be substitutes. Thus, a
consumer’s choice within a good with di¤erent qualities di¤ers from that among di¤erent homogeneous
goods, where only quantity matters.
It is also assumed that each consumer has a preference ranking over some non-quality attributes of
the product, which is independent of quality. Once the consumer chooses a particular quality at a given
price, he/she chooses a brand with the non-quality attributes that is closest to his/her most preferred
characteristics. For example, a consumer’s preference over light or dark color becomes a concern only
after the consumer decides the type of a computer to purchase. We further assume that consumers are
uniformly distributed over a circle in the non-quality attributes space. Let d be the distance of a brand
from a consumer’s most preferred characteristics in the non-quality attributes space.
The consumer spends his/her remaining income on the homogeneous good and his/her utility in-
creases with the consumption of the homogeneous good. It is also assumed that there is an envy
e¤ect, i.e. a consumer loses utility, ®, if someone else is consuming a good with a higher quality. If
y ¡ ® ¢ 1(qi < q) represents a consumer’s utility net of the envy e¤ect, except for a distance term
characterizing the horizontal di¤erentiation among non-quality attributes, then a consumer’s preference
can be characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function between the homogeneous and the
di¤erentiated goods:
U = y +
p
qi ¡ ® ¢ 1(qi < q)¡ d2i (3)
where i indexes the quality of good X, y is the consumption of good Y , and q is the highest quality
available in the market:
5Here, the quality of good X, q, is endogenously chosen and depends on h and ¸. At a given technology indexed by
h and ¸, the technique used in the X-sector is indexed by its capital-labor intensity, ¸q. The e¤ect of ¸ on the …nal
capital-labor intensity in sector X is ambiguous as q can be a decreasing function of ¸.
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A consumer’s utility increases with the consumption of good Y at a constant rate and the quality
of good X at a decreasing rate, and decreases with envy and the distance away from the most preferred
non-quality attribute. Naturally, some consumers have a higher ® than others. For simplicity, it is
assumed that there are only two types of consumers. ¯ percent of them cares nothing about other’s
consumption so that their ® is zero while the remaining 1¡ ¯ percent has an arbitrary positive ®.
China and the rest of the world are assumed to di¤er only in their endowments of capital/skilled
labor (K) and unskilled labor (L), and in their technology parameters, h and ¸. Hereafter, all the
corresponding variables for the rest of the world have an asterisk superscript. It is also assumed that
China has a lower capital-labor endowment ratio (K=L) and a less advanced technology (a lower h and
a higher ¸) than the rest of the world.
In the following analysis, we consider the wage trajectory, …rst, from autarky to trade, and then,
from pure goods trade to trade with foreign direct investment. We then consider the extent of China’s
compliance with intellectual property rights regulations and the sequential investment behavior by
multinationals.
The entrance decision of a multinational …rm is modeled in three periods. In period one, …rms in
each country choose whether they want to go multinational, and if so, what quality (qm) they want to
produce. In period two, all the multinational …rms conduct research to develop the new variety with
quality qm, which combines the comparative advantages of both developed and developing countries.
Suppose the probability of successfully developing such a new variety is s. If there is no intellectual
property rights protection in China, then s is independent of the number (m) of multinational …rms in
the race to develop the new variety. Otherwise, s decreases with m. Also, the development uses ° units
of capital/skilled labor and incurs a sunk cost of Fm that includes the R&D cost for a new variety. If
° is small, then each multinational …rm has a negligible e¤ect on factor prices. In period three, the
successful …rm(s) introduce(s) the new variety into the international market and compete for market
share. Imitation takes place in this period only if intellectual property rights are not strictly enforced
in China.
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3 Autarky to Free Trade without FDI
For simplicity, we normalize the wage rate to one, i.e. w = 1. Under perfect competition, the price
of good Y (py) is equal to its marginal cost of production, which can be derived from the Cobb-Douglas






where r is the rent payment to capital/skilled labor. If each consumer contributes one unit of labor and
has an equal share of capital, then I = wL+rKL is a consumer’s total income.
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In the di¤erentiated good sector, each …rm has the same marginal cost given by production function
(2) to produce a given quality. Let pq be the price of good X with quality q. To compete with producers



















q¡ (xi2 )2 = I¡pjpy +
p
q¡ (Ln ¡ xi2 )2; where pj is the price charged by the other
…rms in a symmetric equilibrium with consumers uniformly distributed on the circle.7 Thus, …rm i’s







+ Ln if pi · py
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To maximize pro…t, …rm i solves the following optimization problem:
max
pi








s:t: pi · pypq (8)
6This income distribution assumption is not crucial to the main results. We can show that most of the results in this
paper are independent of capital distribution as a result of the utility function’s quasi-linearity.
7 It is later proved in Lemma 1 that only one quality is produced under autarky. However, if there were more than one
quality, then we would replace L with the total demand for each quality.
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where c(q) = 1h(w+¸qr) is derived from production function (2). In a symmetric equilibrium, pi = pj = p
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Given this demand for each given quality and the zero-pro…t condition under free entry and exit to pin
down n, Lemma 1 gives a …rm’s optimal quality as proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Since all the monopolistic …rms in each country have access to the same technology, they








Denote the price of good X as px and the quality as q. Together with the zero-pro…t condition





, then the number of …rms in the X-sector is small enough for
each …rm to charge a monopoly price in the absence of good Y . Thus, the price of good Y sets an
upper bound, py
p















At px = py
p
q, both goods are produced and everybody consumes one unit of good X. Substituting
equation (4) into (10), at autarky, the equilibrium total production (X), price (px) and quality level (q)
for good X are given by the following equations:

















Finally, the following full employment conditions give the equilibrium rent and the total production

















2Y = K (18)
Proposition 1 summarizes the autarky equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let k = KL ; x =
X
L ; and y =
Y














, then the autarky equilibrium
is given by:


















































If h · 1, then y = 0. If h2 < ¸, then px < MCx and x = n = 0. In the rest of the paper, we consider
the case where h2 > 1 > ¸ > 0 and (h¤)2 > 1 > ¸¤ > 0 (A1) so that both goods are produced in autarky
in both countries. For the wage to rent ratio to be lower in China than in the rest of the world due to











are no multinational …rms, then each monopolistic …rm has to use the technologies and factors available
in its own country. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the appendix proves the following proposition.

































, the free trade
equilibrium commodity and factor prices and qualities are given by the following equations:




















































For the relative wage of skilled labor to fall as China moves from autarky to free trade, we assume
¯¤L¤ < (1¡ ¯)L (A3). In the absence of FDI, quality and technology di¤erentiation by itself still lead
to results consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Clearly, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem also
holds if FDI is in low-tech sectors with homogeneous goods and technologies to pro…t from China’s





L > 1 +
L
L¤ > 2 (A4) so that the quality produced in China increases moving
from autarky to free trade, but, is still lower than that in the rest of the world.
4 Free Trade with FDI
Helpman (1984 and 1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) point out that a multinational …rm can
locate di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent countries to capture gains from factor price di¤erentials
between countries. Applying Helpman’s approach to this case, a multinational …rm can apply the
technology, indexed by h¤ and ¸¤, in a developed country to a production plant in China. As in
Helpman (1984 and 1985), a multinational …rm would produce a new variety with a quality in between
the two existing varieties so that the multinational …rm would compete with the local …rms for the
low-type consumers with ® = 0.
Recall the assumptions in section 2 that the multinational …rm has to employ ° units of capi-
tal/skilled labor to conduct research to develop such a variety, which combines the advantage of a more
advanced technology with that of a cheaper labor force in China. As the wage to rent ratio is lower in
China, a multinational …rm always locates its research lab for a new variety in a developed country and
its production site in China. The local plant produces the new variety while the foreign plant under-
takes R&D for developing the new medium-quality variety. The multinational …rm(s) who has(have)
successfully developed the new medium quality variety would compete for the low-type consumers. This
competition depends on how strictly intellectual property rights are enforced in China.
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4.1 Strict Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Suppose intellectual property rights are strictly enforced in China so that once a multinational …rm
introduces a new variety into the market, no other …rms can produce a brand of the same quality
even with a di¤erent non-quality attribute. This will make the …rst multinational …rm of a successfully
developed new variety, qm, a monopolist in the market of brands with quality qm. With this monopoly
power, the multinational …rm can have a relatively larger market share than the other local …rms. As a
result, when the multinational …rm chooses its price pm, market share Xm, and quality qm to maximize
its pro…t, the multinational …rm would take into consideration the e¤ect of its output level, Xm, on the
equilibrium factor prices in China. The appendix proves that the multinational …rm chooses a higher
quality, which leads to a higher relative return to the skilled labor. The …nal equilibrium is characterized
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. With strict protection of intellectual property rights and assumptions (A1) to (A4), a
multinational …rm can take over the whole market for the low-type consumers and drive all the
local …rms out of market. The equilibrium in China is captured by the following equations with




























FDI increases both the relative return to skilled labor and the quality of China’s exports and
terms of trade. With FDI in a di¤erentiated sector, contrary to the case of free trade or FDI in
homogeneous sectors, the relative wage of skilled labor in China can be higher under trade than
under autarky if the technology of the FDI source country is much more advanced than that in
China, i.e. (h
¤




¸ ¡ 1h .
Finally, we examine the …rst period when …rms decide whether they want to go multinational and
enter the race of developing a new variety with quality qm determined by equations (29) to (32).
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Given its probability of success, s, a multinational …rm has an incentive to develop the above variety
if and only if its expected pro…t is positive, or at least non-negative, as its expected pro…t is zero if
it produces either the high-quality variety in the rest of the world or the low-quality variety in China
under monopolistic competition. Substituting equations (29) to (32) into the …rm’s pro…t function,
the following condition gives the number of multinational …rms (m) who are willing to compete for










)¡ °r¤ ¡ Fm = 0 (33)
The above condition suggests that the more advanced the foreign technology (h¤ and/or ¸¤), the
lower the sunk cost of developing a new variety (Fm), the less the capital requirement for developing a
new variety (°), and the lower the rent in the rest of the world (r¤) determined by equation (26), the
larger are the number of multinational …rms in the race of developing the new medium-quality variety
and the more likely is the appearance of such a new variety. Thus, we are more likely to observe a rise
of the relative return to capital/skilled labor in China even though this does not happen during the
movement from autarky to free trade without multinationals.
4.2 Weak Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
If the intellectual property rights protection in China do not restrict …rms to produce products of
the same quality, then once the …rst multinational …rm introduces the new variety to the market, other
multinational and local …rms can imitate the variety with the same quality. Suppose the cost for a
local …rm to grasp the more advanced technology h¤ and ¸¤ by imitating the new variety is ' units
of capital or skilled labor. If ' is much smaller than °, then the local …rms will not be driven out
of the market, but will employ domestic skilled and unskilled labor to produce goods with quality qm
determined by equation (32), but with di¤erent attributes, and sell at price pm determined by equation
(31). The zero-pro…t condition is (h
¤




n ¡'r = 0 where ¯+¯¤L
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Proposition 4. With weak protection of intellectual property rights and assumptions (A1) to (A4),
a multinational …rm cannot take over the whole market of the low-type consumers and the local







then the trade equilibrium is still captured by equations (24) to (28), except that r is determined
by equation (36) rather than (25). Thus, like in the case with strict protection of intellectual
property rights, trade with FDI in a di¤erentiated sector increases the relative return to skilled
labor, China’s relatively scarce factor, although this cannot happen when there is only trade but no
FDI in sectors of vertically di¤erentiated goods produced with di¤erent techniques.
Comparing equation (36) with (29), the relative return to capital or skilled labor in China is higher
without than with intellectual property rights protection although the new variety has a lower quality
and hence use a more labor intensive production technique. This is because skilled labor is employed in
the product imitation process by local …rms in order for them to stay competitively in the international
market. From equation (36), this result holds regardless of how many units of labor each local …rm uses
in the imitation process because ' only a¤ects the number of survival local …rms. This further con…rms
that factor or commodity prices are set at the margin and are not so much a¤ected by sales volume.
4.3 Intellectual Property Rights and Wage Inequality
We now compare the equilibrium quality and factor prices under strict and weak intellectual property
rights protection in China. In the initial development stage, since a multinational …rm’s probability to
succeed (s) is decreasing in the number of …rms in the race (m) under strict intellectual property rights
protection and is independent of m under weak intellectual property rights protection, the probability
to receive a positive payo¤ from innovating a new variety is lower under stricter intellectual property
rights. Hence, the initial incentive and the likelihood of developing a new medium-quality variety is
lower with stricter intellectual property rights protection.
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Once a new quality is introduced to the market, intellectual property rights still play a signi…cant role
in sales and future quality development. In the case with weak intellectual property rights protection,
local …rms would be able to stay in the market and employ local capital/skilled labor to imitate the
quality produced by the …rst multinational …rm. Equations (29) and (36) show that stricter intellectual
property rights protection not only delays the rise of relative wage of skilled labor but also slows it down
once it starts to rise. This result holds even if each …rm uses little skilled labor in imitation.
In sum, stricter intellectual property rights protection in China protects inventor’s pro…ts, but delays
the quality upgrade in China. Since the relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor is lower with
stricter intellectual property rights protection as discussed above, intellectual property rights also ensure
a bigger improvement in China’s export quality and terms of trade in the long-run with less adverse
income distribution impact on unskilled labor. Therefore, intellectual property rights protection helps
China to gradually upgrade its output and become more competitive in the international market with
less cost imposed on China’s unskilled labor.
However, there are also several short falls for a stricter intellectual property rights protection. First,
the speed of this quality upgrade in China and the technology spillover from FDI in the short-run is
slower under stricter intellectual property rights protection although it protects the long-term incentives
for technology transfer from developed to developing countries. Second, stricter intellectual property
rights protection restricts the number of varieties produced by local producers and hence may induce
more imports as China reduces its tari¤ to join the WTO. The competition between local producers
and foreign …rms via FDI are much more intense.
On the other hand, as characterize in the Chinese word, “Wei Ji” (challenge), no risk no opportunity,
this to live or to die situation for local …rms can also be the exact incentive China needs to discipline a
lot of its SOEs to …ght against corruption and to excel in R&D. Although China does not have a relative
advantage in extensive R&D that requires a lot skilled labor and capital, China can de…nitely compete
in R&D in industries, such as software and information science, which require people with great skills
and talent but not in large numbers. Indeed, China is showing great potentials in those industries and
many foreign investors have already been attracted to China to build research labs.
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4.4 Empirical Evidence
The pattern of FDI in China shows that investments from developed countries are mostly in high-
tech sectors with vertically di¤erentiated goods (mostly capital/technology intensive), while investments
from developing countries are mostly in low-tech sectors with homogeneous or horizontally di¤erentiated
goods (mostly labor intensive). The theoretical …ndings of this paper show that, …rst, FDI can a¤ect
the relative wages regardless of its small share in GDP. Second, FDI in high-tech sectors will increase
the relative wage of skilled to unskilled labor. To test these results, we ideally need a data set of wages
by occupation, and apply rigorous cross-sector empirical analysis to take into consideration all factors
a¤ecting relative wages. However, the following stylized facts can also provide support to our theoretical
results.
Figure 3 depicts the annual growth of average real wages across sectors after adjusting for in‡ation.
As the growth of real wages in the real estate management and manufacturing sectors went through a
cycle of up in the early 1990s, down in the mid-1990s, and up again in the late 1990s, the wage in the
agricultural and mining sectors followed a similar but lagged cycle. It appears that sectors with larger
FDI shares (manufacturing and real estate management) led the wage growth cycle. Moreover, Figure
4 shows that this cycle coincides with the growth rate of FDI in the 1990s after adjusting for in‡ation.
Among the factors that contribute to real wage growth, FDI is clearly related to wage increases in
FDI concentrated sectors, either capital/technology intensive sectors (real estate management) or labor
intensive sectors (part of manufacturing). Such wage increases also appear to spread to other sectors
(agriculture and mining). The upward pressure on overall wage growth brought about by FDI is evident.
More importantly, available data can show further that the wage increase for skilled labor outpace
that for unskilled labor. Figure 5 clearly shows that the average nominal wage gap between the relatively
di¤erentiated or capital/skilled labor intensive sectors (electric/gas and real estate) and the relatively
homogeneous or unskilled labor intensive sectors (agriculture and mining) widened over the years from
1990 to 1998. This implies that, while other factors may have a¤ected wage inequality, large FDI
in‡ows to the relatively di¤erentiated sectors have unmistakably contributed to the increase of the
relative wage of skilled labor employed in these sectors. Figure 5 also shows that the average nominal
wage gap widened as well between the real estate management sector representing a high skill intensive
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and di¤erentiated sector and the manufacturing sector that has both di¤erentiated and homogeneous
products. All of these con…rm that, as export oriented FDI ‡ows to di¤erentiated high-tech sectors, the
wage inequality of skilled to unskilled labor will increase rather than decrease under freer trade.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper develops a general equilibrium trade model and shows that the relative wage of skilled
labor to unskilled labor in China will increase as China opens up more market and attracts more
FDI into high-tech sectors. This extends the standard Stolper-Samuelson theory with homogeneous
products and technologies, which predicts that the relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor can
only decrease in the absence of product di¤erentiation. As more FDI ‡ows into the Chinese economy,
especially to sectors such as telecommunication, information technology, and banking and …nancial
services as included in China’s recent WTO agreements with the US and EU, the gap between skilled
and unskilled labor is likely to increase in the future.
There is, however, no reason to fear the wage gap. Technology di¤usion and quality upgrade increase
the demand for skilled labor and change division of labor. As China integrates further into the global
economy and moves from exporting labor intensive to increasingly more skill/capital intensive goods,
this trend of relative wage increase for skilled labor is only to continue. It is important though that
we understand the impact of FDI impact on wages, so that we can minimize the negative e¤ect, and
maximize the bene…ts associated with FDI.
The theoretic results of this paper demonstrate that FDI can upgrade technology, improve the skills
of China’s work force, enhance the product quality of local industries, and increase their competitiveness
in international markets. China stands to gain from FDI in‡ows. But often authorities o¤er more
incentives to high tech FDI in di¤erentiated sectors, which will increase wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled labor. One policy implication can be drawn from the analysis in the paper is that
elimination of special treatment of FDI in those sectors will help reduce the negative impact on income
distribution and provide a level playing ground for stable long term FDI.
Given the upward pressure on wages and the competition for labor brought about by FDI, it is also
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important to reform the labor market and wage system to empower domestic …rms with more autonomy
in hiring and …ring workers and in setting wages, so that domestic …rms are not disadvantaged in
competition. Given the mounting unemployment problem, reforms of SOEs have been understandably
cautious, especially with regard to labor and wage decisions. But delaying the reform process can
only stall problems for the future. Experience of the private sector in recent years proves that market
economy is the source of growth and employment.
The analysis in this paper also provides insights in the role of intellectual property rights protection
on FDI and wage inequality. The results show that stricter intellectual property rights protection will
deliver higher qualities for China’s exports and hence lead to better terms of trade, and at the same
time, will slow the rise of relative wages of skilled labor, and protect the welfare of unskilled labor.
The trade-o¤ is that stricter intellectual property rights protection is likely to expose domestic …rms to
more competition from FFEs and greater danger of losing market shares to FFEs. However, technology
di¤usion by FDI can also spur local …rms to develop newer and better products. Strengthening the
protection of intellectual property rights should clearly be an integral part of China’s FDI policy.
17
Appendix
1. Proof of Lemma 1.

















q ¡ ® (A.2)
where pq is the price of good X with quality q.
Under these conditions, a consumer with ® = 0 consumes one unit of the low-quality good while a consumer
with ® > 0 consumes one unit of the high-quality good. Let nl be the number of …rms producing the low-quality
variety and nh be that for the high-quality variety. If py(
¯L
nl
)2 ¸ pypq ¡ c(q) and py( (1¡¯)Lnh )2 ¸ py
p
q ¡ c(q) so
that the price of good Y sets an upper bound for the prices of both varieties of good X,8 then from equation (9)
in the main text,
pq = py(
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If each …rm ignores its e¤ect on the number of …rms in the market, then the …rst order conditions for the two















Hence, q = q so that there is only one variety produced in autarky. ¤
2. Proof of Proposition 2.
Under the assumptions in section 3 and the Cobb-Douglas technology in the Y -sector, if the price for good Y
is equalized through free trade, then equation (4) implies that the factor prices under perfect competition must
8We will check whether these conditions are satis…ed after we solve for q and q. If these conditions do not hold, then
each …rm would have enough monopoly power to charge the same mark-up over its marginal cost regardless of its quality
so that they can produce whatever quality they want.
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satisfy the following condition:
wr = w¤r¤ (A.8)
We continue to normalize the local wage rate to one so that r = r¤ if and only if w¤ = w = 1.
Given the autarky equilibrium in China captured by equations (19) to (23) and that in the rest of the world
by replacing h by h¤, ¸ by ¸¤, and k by k¤ in equations (19) to (23), China has a comparative advantage in
producing the X-good with a lower quality while the rest of the world has a comparative advantage in producing
a higher quality X-good and good Y . In the international market, there will be inter-industry trade for good Y
and intra-industry trade for good X with di¤erent qualities. China imports good Y and the high-quality X-good
while it exports the low-quality X-good.
By assumption, ¯ percent of China’s labor force and ¯¤ percent of the rest of the world’s labor force has
® = 0 while the rest has ® > 0. Following the discussions in the previous section, if the competition with good








, then …rms in
China charge a price of px = py
p
q with a total demand of ¯L+ ¯¤L¤ while …rms in the rest of the world charge
a price p¤x with a total demand of (1¡ ¯)L+ (1¡ ¯¤)L¤, where p¤x satis…es (I¡px¤ )py +
p
q¤ = (I¡px)py +
p
q ¡ ®.9
In the absence of any intellectual property rights, each …rm in the China and the rest of the world, respectively,
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¡ F ¤ (A.10)
where py is given by equation (4). The full employment conditions in each country are:
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, then following the derivations in the
9 If …rms in both countries sell the same quality, then we should replace each …rm’s demand by L+L
¤
n+n¤ . However, the
…rst order conditions (A.9) and (A.10) would suggest that …rms in di¤erent countries would deviate and sell varieties with
di¤erent qualities. Given their endowment and technology di¤erences, home …rms cannot drive out foreign …rms in the
high-quality market, neither can foreign …rms drive out home …rms in the low-quality market. Thus, in a stable equilibrium,
…rms in di¤erent countries produce varieties with di¤erent qualities while …rms within a country produce varieties with
the same quality.
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autarky case, the free trade equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
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(A.24)
I = w + rk; I¤ = w¤ + r¤k¤ (A.25)
¤
3. Proof of Proposition 3.
Let xm = X
m
L . Given x
m, qm and q = h
2
¸2





































2 y = k (A.27)
Since w = 1, solving for the factor prices gives
r =
1 + (h¸ ¡ 1h )(¯ + ¯¤ L
¤
L )¡ (h¸ ¡ 1h + 1h¤ )xm
k ¡ ¸¤h¤ qmxm
(A.28)
Equation (A.28) shows that a larger market share, xm, can increase the relative return to capital or skilled labor
as the multinational …rm uses a more capital intensive technique to produce a higher quality than the other …rms
in China. It can also decrease the relative return as the multinational …rm also uses a more advanced technology
that saves the use of both capital and labor. The relative return to unskilled labor falls if the quality is su¢ciently
high so that the former e¤ect dominates the latter. Also, drdqm = r
¸¤xm
h¤k¡¸¤qmxm > 0 so that the multinational …rm
can cause the rent to rise by choosing a higher quality.
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    Table 1: Number of Staff and Workers by Ownership (10,000 persons)
Year Total Urban
Sub-        State-owned Urban Collective Owned      Foreign Funded*
Total Number % in Urban Number % in Urban Number % in Urban
1985 49873 12808 8990 70.19 3324 25.95 6 0.05
1986 51282 13293 9333 70.21 3421 25.74 12 0.09
1987 52783 13783 9654 70.04 3488 25.31 21 0.15
1988 54334 14627 9984 68.26 3527 24.11 31 0.21
1989 55329 14390 10108 70.24 3502 24.34 47 0.33
1990 63909 16616 10346 62.27 3549 21.36 66 0.40
1991 64799 16977 10664 62.81 3628 21.37 165 0.97
1992 65554 17241 10889 63.16 3621 21.00 221 1.28
1993 66373 17589 10920 62.08 3393 19.29 452 2.57
1994 67199 18413 11214 60.90 3285 17.84 698 3.79
1995 67947 19093 11261 58.98 3147 16.48 830 4.35
1996 68850 19815 11244 56.74 3016 15.22 903 4.56
1997 69600 20207 11044 54.65 2883 14.27 1049 5.19
1998 69957 20678 9058 43.81 1963 9.49 1481 7.16
* Including employments in firms funded by foreign entrepreneurs and by entrepreneurs
from Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan, and share holding firms by these entrepreneurs.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1986 to 1999.
      Table 2: Average Wage of Staff and Workers by Ownership (Yuan)
Year National          State-owned          Collective Owned          Foreign Funded*
Average Wage ∆ to national Wage ∆ to national Wage ∆ to national
1985 1148 1213 5.66% 967 -15.77% 1896 65.14%
1986 1329 1414 6.40% 1092 -17.83% 1862 40.07%
1987 1459 1546 5.96% 1207 -17.27% 2004 37.36%
1988 1747 1853 6.07% 1426 -18.37% 2165 23.95%
1989 1935 2055 6.20% 1557 -19.53% 2504 29.42%
1990 2140 2284 6.73% 1681 -21.45% 2746 28.33%
1991 2340 2477 5.85% 1866 -20.26% 5237 123.78%
1992 2711 2878 6.16% 2109 -22.21% 4495 65.79%
1993 3371 3532 4.78% 2592 -23.11% 5205 54.41%
1994 4538 4797 5.71% 3245 -28.49% 6423 41.53%
1995 5500 5625 2.27% 3931 -28.53% 7572 37.67%
1996 6210 6280 1.13% 4302 -30.72% 8368 34.74%
1997 6470 6747 4.28% 4512 -30.26% 8894 37.47%
1998 7479 7668 2.53% 5331 -28.72% 9297 24.30%
* Including wages in firms funded by foreign entrepreneurs and by entrepreneurs from
Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan, and share holding firms by these entrepreneurs.
Average wages are higher for firms funded by foreign entrepreneurs only.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1986 to 1999.





















































































































































































































Source: Calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 1998 and 1999. 













Developing Countries Developed Countries
Figure 2: Sectoral Composition of the Largest FFEs in 
Manufacturing by Country Group
Technology-intensive Capital-intensive Labor-intensive
        Source: Calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 1998 and 1999. 
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    Source: Calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 1998 and 1999. 
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Source: Calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 1998 and 1999. 
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